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On occasion the Supreme Court is faced with a conflict between
important public values. The two cases contesting race-conscious
admissions decision-making at the University of Michigan' placed the
Court in just such a circumstance. The plaintiffs represented the powerful
principle of color-blindness in governmental decision-making and the
other side defended the equally powerful principle of racial justice.2 Both
sides would appear in some ways to be on the side of angels. One cannot
reconcile the result of the cases without acknowledging that neither
principle, by itself, controls. Dr. Loury frames the conflict well:
Thus when debating the[se] questions . . . River, we are
engaged in a basic argument about public values. But, just
what are the principles at issue? Two normative concerns
seem to be elemental in this debate:
1. To establishnon-discrimination,or color-blindness,as a
proceduralideal.
(People should be treated without regardto their racial
identity. Race is a morally irrelevanttrait.)
2. To pursue racial equality, or racial justice, as a
substantivepublic good
(Given a history marredby racialinjustice, we shouldtry
to reduce group inequalitiesin wealth andpower.)
Both of these concerns bear on the issue of race and ethics,
but in different ways. The first looks to how people are
treatedin discrete encounters, affirming as a value thatsuch

1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311-15 (2003) (contesting the admissions process of
the Law School at the University of Michigan); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003)
(contesting the admissions process of the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts at the
University of Michigan).
2. For a discussion ofthe clash ofthese principles in admissions decision-making, see Glenn
C. Loury, Forewordto WItLuM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE INCOLLEGE ADMISSIONS (2d prtg. 1998).
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treatment should not be conditioned on race. The second
normativeconcern looks to broadpatternsofsocial disparity
between racial groups, advancing as an ethical ideal that
such differences should be reduced The first concern deals
with the rights of individuals; it is process-orientedand ahistorical.The second concern is motivated by the status of
groups; it isfocused on outcomes and rooted in history.3
Professor Crump's article 4 is an example of legal analysis that takes
little note of the context in which the Court resolves legal issues. The
historical context of race in higher education, the context of race in
American society, and the context of the use of race-conscious admissions
processes were important factors in the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger. The Court understood the importance of both
principles and found a way to accommodate both in its decisions. It used
context to hold that race-conscious admissions decision-making regimes
can be constructed in a constitutional manner. Professor Crump criticized
what he saw as flaws in the Court's decision. That he comes out in the end
in favor of some race-consciousness, reflects the simple but powerful
concept that higher education fails society in important ways if it does not
aspire to make higher education more racially and ethnically diverse. This
goal is so important that colleges and universities must make concrete and
effective efforts to ensure that this diversity is a reality.
The plaintiffs in the two cases against the University of Michigan
pursued two alternative legal strategies in seeking to have the admissions
processes found unconstitutional. On the one hand, the plaintiffs argued
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence had changed in the intervening
years since the decision in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,5 such that Bakke was no longer good law.6 In the alternative, they
argued that even if Bakke were still tenable, the admissions processes of
the University of Michigan Law School (hereinafter Law School) and the
undergraduate program at the University did not meet the standards of
strict scrutiny.7 Strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest in using
race to discriminate when conveying a state benefit; and even if there is a
compelling state interest, the state action must be narrowly tailored to

3. Id. at xxii.
4. David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases:
Reconsideringthe Supreme Court'sApprovalin Gratz and Grutter ofRace-BasedDecision-Making
by IndividualizedDiscretion,56 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268.
7. See id. at 269.
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achieve the goals of the compelling interest with the least interference with
individual rights!
Opponents of race-conscious admissions and commentators, like
Professor Crump, either miss or dismiss a critical guiding precept in the
way the Court applied strict scrutiny in these two cases. That precept is
that context matters, and that, in the context of higher education, the Court
looks differently at matters of race. Justice O'Connor makes this very
point early in her opinion for the majority of the Court.9 The Court has
long held that higher education holds a place of special importance in
American society.'I Colleges and universities derive autonomy from the
First Amendment in determining curriculum, faculty hiring and student
selection. "
In his article, Professor Crump does what law professors do. He picks
apart the logic of the opinion of the Court in these cases. His approach is
a useful pedagogical approach to teaching constitutional jurisprudence. He
purports to, in the end, come out in favor of some race-conscious
admissions decision-making 2 although, in his view, the Court was sloppy
in its reasoning. 3 He also believes that the decision in Grutterpermits too
much "Unchecked Discretion."' 4 For advocates of diversity in higher
education, friends like Professor Crump are cold comfort. The thrust of my
response, like Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, is that "[c]ontext
matters."' 5 When a college, university, or professional school sets out to

8. For an analysis of strict scrutiny doctrine, see Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996);
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,515 U.S. 200,235-37 (1995); City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) ("Context matters when reviewing
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause .... ).
"[I]n dealing with claims under broad provisions ofthe Constitution, which derive
content by an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that
generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to
them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts."
Id. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960)). Further, "not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework
for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." Id.
10. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U. S. 589,603 (1967); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
i1. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.

12. See Crump, supra note 4, at 29-43.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
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establish an admissions policy and a process for implementing the policy,
there are many variables that influence both the policy and the decisionmaking process. The Court in Gruttertook note of the complexity of both
developing and implementing an admissions policy.' 6
I write from the perspective of someone who had a real stake in the
outcome in Grutter."7 This Article is written from the perspective of an
admissions professional who, for more than twenty years at three different
law schools, has helped shape admissions policies, recruited applicants,
read tens of thousands of law school admissions applications, debated in
admissions committee meetings the various arguments for and against the
admission of real candidates, and observed the results of the admissions
process played out by actual students during their law school and
professional careers.
Context matters when considering these two cases. Professor Crump
makes the mistake of placing the focus only on how race could play out in
admissions decision-making. His focus is on potential issues and how they
fit into strict scrutiny analysis in individual cases. Professor Crump is right
to observe some of the potential problems and to question their role in the
process. However, by looking at admissions decision-making as a dynamic
process, it becomes clear that admissions decision-making on each
candidate's application cannot reasonably be elevated to a constitutional
conundrum; to do so would paralyze the decision-making process. A
careful review of the way the Law School actually developed and
implemented its admissions policies puts the Court's reasoning into a
context that helps us understand how the Court found a compelling interest
for the diversity the Law School sought.
I. THE CONTEXT FOR FINDING A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST

Professor Crump's major objection to the majority opinion in Grutter
has to do with its analysis of the narrow tailoring prong of the strict
scrutiny doctrine."8 However, he does spend time on the issue of whether
or not Michigan proved a compelling state interest. He argues that
viewpoint diversity and "pure racial diversity" are not compelling state
interests.' 9 Arguably, the Court agrees with Professor Crump on these two
points. The defense based its argument on viewpoint diversity because it
was the only avenue that was available. Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke2 and the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence in the intervening

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 311-16.
1was a named defendant in Grutter.
Crump, supra note 4, at 49.
Id. at 21-29.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (Powell, J.).
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years foreclosed the other possible arguments that may have been posited
to support the defendants' practices. 1 But this is where I believe Justice
O'Connor and the justices who joined her majority opinion in Grutter
were swayed by the context of race-conscious admissions practices in
higher education. The district court and the plaintiffs agreed that diversity
is an admirable aspiration for higher education.22 However, the plaintiffs
argued and the district court held that the Constitution does not permit
institutions to do anything directly to achieve this admirable ambition.23
How did the Supreme Court take note of the context? There are several
ways. The Court began by considering the First Amendment arguments set
forth by Justice Powell in Bakke regarding the importance of academic
freedom and the role of higher education in supporting that freedom.24 The
Court acknowledged that institutions of higher education possess special
expertise in areas relevant to their educational endeavors.25
A. The Admissions Policy Statement andIts OriginsProvide a
Contextfor Findinga Compelling State Interestfor
Race-ConsciousAdmissions Decision-Making
Justice O'Connor appropriately begins her analysis in Grutter by
looking to the Report andRecommendationsofthe Admissions Committee
(the Policy).26 This document and the method of its drafting provided the
context the Court used to find a compelling state interest. The Policy set
the parameters for admissions decision-making at the Law School. Cynical
opponents to race-conscious admissions decision-making allege that the
purpose of the Policy is simply a dodge to provide cover for racial quotas.
A more even-handed reading of the Policy does not support this
contention. The Policy begins by setting forth its aspirations.27 It then

21. For analysis of the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard, see, for
example Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,909-12 (1996); Adarand ConstructorsInc. v. Pena,515 U.S.
200, 219-30 (1995); and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989).
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,849-50 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Brieffor the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
23. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 850; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-10,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-24 (2003) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14
(Powell, J.)).
25. Id. at 328-30.
26. Id. at 311-16; UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
ADMISSIONS COmmrrrEE (1992) [hereinafter POLICY]. The Policy was adopted by the Law School
faculty on April 24, 1992. Id.
27. POLICY, supranote 26, at 1. The opening paragraph reads:
Our goal is to admit a group of students who individually and collectively are
among the most capable students applying to American law schools in a given
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discusses how the makeup of the student body is important to the
aspirations enumerated.2"
The process by which the Policy was drafted is as important for finding
context as the text of the document itself. The process that yielded the
Policy was thoroughly exposed during discovery for the trial in the district
court and as a part of the evidence presented at trial.29 Thus, both the
document and the drafting process were available to the Court during its
consideration of the case.
The Policy was the end-product of admissions committee deliberations
that covered most of the academic year of 1991-1992. The admissions
office at the Law School was in transition. The former dean of admissions
had left in the summer of 1990 and I came on board in July of 1991. The
dean of admissions at the Law School was the primarydecision-maker on
applications for admission. The transition to a new dean turned out to be
an excellent time to review the process and establish revised policies. This
fact was especially true because an in-depth review of policies and
procedures had not been performed in quite some time and the former
admissions officer had left in part because there was dissatisfaction with
the results he had produced in recent years.

year. As individuals we expect our admittees not only to have substantial promise
for success in law school but also to have a strong likelihood of succeeding in the
practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of others.
Michigan has many alumni who are esteemed legal practitioners, leaders of the
American bar, significant contributors to the legal scholarship and/or selfless
contributors to public interest. Those we admit should have the potential to follow
in these traditions.
Id.
28. Id.
In the classroom setting the educational experience depends in large measure on
the quality of student performance. Many law school classes depend on prepared
and articulate students to advance the discussion, and in all classes perceptive,
original observations can teach both faculty and students alike. We also recognize
that much that is educationally valuable occurs not in the classroom but in
informal conversations and in the more formal activities of numerous student
organizations such as Michigan's many law journals, various ethnic-, religiousand gender-focused groups, numerous practice oriented and law specialty societies
and diverse political groups of the left, right and in between. As a group our
students have the responsibility for maintaining and changing this vibrant extracurricular life in ways that respond to their own needs and concerns. At the
admissions stage we value people who have shown the capacity to be selfeducating and to contribute to the learning of those around them.
Id. at 1-2.
29. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829-30 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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The committee studied all aspects of the admissions process. The
members read several hundred application files and discussed them in
detail. The school produced and the committee reviewed correlation
studies to see how LSAT scores and cumulative academic records related
to law school performance. The results of annual surveys of the Law
School's graduates were also made available to the committee. Informed
by volumes of information and the review of several hundred applications,
the committee set out to draft what would ultimately become the Policy.
The Policy went through numerous drafts, and the committee discussed the
drafts in meetings. The Policy was submitted to the faculty for review and
discussion and passed unanimously in April of 1992.30
The Court had ample evidence that the Law School had been
thoughtful and thorough in developing the Policy.3 ' The drafting process
revealed that the school had special expertise and used that expertise to
propound a thoughtful admissions policy. Through the Policy, the school
articulated its interest in the admissions process and what the school hoped
to achieve through the students admitted into its program. Thus, the Court
had a basis for believing that the school possessed the expertise to discern
what was important for the education of its students and how to achieve it.
This provided the context for the deference to academic judgment Justice
O'Connor speaks of in her opinion.32
B. The History of Race in Higher Education Provideda Broader
Contextfor Findinga Compelling State Interestfor RaceConsciousAdmissions Decision-Making
A look backward at the historical horizon shows a higher education
system that held very little opportunity for people of color. This is not to
say that our flagship state universities and elite private colleges were
devoid of students of color, but until late in the twentieth century, the
presence of students of color was the rare exception. This fact was
particularly true in the South, where there were major battles in the 1960s
to integrate flagship public universities in Alabama, Georgia, and
Mississippi. Likewise, the more elite private universities in the South did
not begin to become integrated until the late 1960s. Even after these battles
were fought and won, students of color did not begin matriculating in
significant numbers at Southern universities until the mid-1970s.
Colleges and universities in the North and other areas of the country,
while not having the explicit antipathy toward integration of those in the
South, still had, at best, modest enrollments of students ofcolor. The major

30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-15.
31. Id. at311-16.
32. Id. at 328-30.
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initiatives to increase minority enrollments on predominantly white
campuses began to take shape in the late 1960s. There was much to
overcome, including varying degrees of resistance on campuses, reluctance
on the part of minority students to venture into what was perceived as
hostile territory to pursue their education, and the difficulty of identifying
likely minority candidates for admission and convincing them to apply. As
a result of these obstacles, colleges and universities implemented wideranging initiatives to increase minority enrollments and provide
programming that improved the likelihood of successful matriculation
through completion of degree requirements.
A consequence of the sad history of race in higher education, especially
at selective public and private institutions, was the limited participation of
African Americans and other people of color in most of the professions
that required advanced education. This was troubling not only because of
the limited opportunities available to Blacks and other people of color, but
also because of the limits such segregation placed on the education of
everyone attending our premier institutions of higher learning. The stirring
of action to correct this imbalance was brought about in large part by the
turmoil of the 1960s and the attendant struggle for civil rights that
occurred during that era. Happily, while many problems still persist in
making sure all Americans, regardless of race, have access to the broad
opportunities this country provides, the circumstances in higher education
today are much better. However, this improvement of opportunity and
result did not happen by accident.
The success of a more integrated higher education apparatus and the
many benefits to American society flowing therefrom are the result of
tremendous effort by individual colleges and universities and the higher
education industry as a whole.33 Race-conscious admissions policies have
been an integral part of this process.34 There have been many benefits of
these efforts on the part of higher education. It can be seen most obviously
in the more significant presence of people of color in positions of power
and influence; that the Court took note of these benefits35 is not surprising.
It would have been surprising for the Court to ignore these benefits. The
Court took note of the firm belief espoused by the defendants that the
educational milieu in the Law School was better as a result, and thus, all
students received a better education.36 The amici briefs filed by highranking former military officers, corporate leaders, and their companies

33. It can arguably be said that an improvement in race relations is one of those benefits. See
generally BOWEN & BOK, supra note 2, at 220-28; Loury, supra note 2.
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
35. Grutter,539 U.S. at 330-33.
36. Id. at 328-30.
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made plain to the Court how compelling ensuring a diverse education was
to their organizations and, by extension, to society at large. 3
If the widespread support made clear by the amici briefs3" was not
enough to show how compelling diversity was to higher education, there
was addtional evidence from other sources. In response to the decision in
Hopwood v. Texas39 the Texas legislature enacted the Ten Percent Plan.
This legislation mandates that students in the top ten percent of each Texas
high school's graduating class are guaranteed admission to one of the two
flagship state universities.40 California and Florida also implemented
"percent plans" to assure some diversity in their public colleges and
universities when race-conscious decision-making was called into

37. Id. at 330-32.
38. There were at least eighty-four amicus briefs filed in the course of the litigation of
Grutter.Of these, 69 were filed in support of the defendants Bollinger, et al. The briefs came from
interested parties from all areas of education and society: Law students (13,922 Current Law
Students, Harvard,Stanfordand Yale Black Law Students Associations,Howard University Law
Students, UCLA School of Law Students of Color, and University of Michigan Law Students

Associations); Corporations and organizations affiliated with businesses (3M, et al. (Fortune500
Corporations), General Motors Corporation, MTV Networks, and Media Companies); Bar
associations and other organizations of lawyers (AmericanBarAssociation,Black Women Lawyers'
Association of Greater Chicago, Boston Bar Association, et al., Human Rights Advocates and
University of Minnesota Human Rights Center, King County Bar Association, et al., Lawyers
Committeefor Civil Rights Under Law, NationalAsian PacificAmerican Legal Consortium, and
NewMexico HispanicBarAssociation);A whole host ofeducation related organizations (American
Educational Research Association, et al., American Psychological Association, American
SociologicalAssociation,etal., Association ofMedical Colleges,etal., and SocialScientists Glenn

C. Loury, et al. to name just a few); Colleges and univesities of every stripe (Amherst College, et
al., Carnegie Mellon University and 37 Fellow Private Colleges and Universities, Columbia
University,etal., HarvardUniversity, et al., HowardUniversity, IndianaUniversity,Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, et al., and the University of Pittsburgh).

Legal education came out in full force with nearly every entity affiliated with legal education
supporting the Michigan Law School in this case. A sampling of the organizations filing briefs for
Michigan includes: American Law Deans Association, Association of American Law Schools,
ClinicalLegal Education Association, Law School Admissions Council,Law School Deans, and

Society ofAmerican Law Teachers. In addition to these supporters of the defendants, there were
other notable supporters who filed amicus briefs, including former military officers (Lt. Gen. Julius
W. Becton, Jr., et al.) and several national unions (American Federationof Laborand Congress of
Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO), and NE-I, its state affiliates, AFSCME and People for the
American Way).

Many others filed briefs, including elected officials, states, and civil rights organizations, but
the sample above provides some sense of the range of entities that came down on the side of the
defendants.
For a full list of the amicus briefs filed on either side in this case, see UNiVERSrrY OF
MICIGAN, ADMISSIONs LAwsurrs, at http//www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/amicus.html
(last updated Nov. 5, 2003).
39. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
40. TEX EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Vernon 2003).
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question.4 Thus, various states also manifested an interest in assuring
diversity in their flagship state universities.
Both history and state legislative action provided the Court with a
context for finding a compelling state interest in race-conscious
admissions decision-making. The states were clearly attempting to find
facially race-neutral ways to assure diverse student bodies at their public
institutions. The amici briefs from businesses, nearly every higher
education association, and former military officers provided ample
evidence that a broad cross-section of interested constituencies in this
nation felt that racial and ethnic diversity in higher education was critical
to this country. Support from all these sources for the University of
Michigan and its race-conscious admissions decision-making processes
established a context for the Court's finding of a compelling interest.
II.

THE LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS PROCESS WAS
NARROWLY TAILORED

Professor Crump's analysis of narrow tailoring leaves much to be
desired. It fails because it is not possible to accurately characterize the
competitiveness of a single candidate for admission without accurately
comparing the LSAT scores, the full academic record (not just the GPA),
essays, letters of recommendation, and other material submitted by a
candidate for admission to the information available about the rest of the
candidates in the pool in a given year. Since Professor Crump does not
have this context for comparison, hisjudgment of the comparative strength
of Grutter's application is limited to just LSAT and GPA. 42 Grutter's
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368-69.
42. Professor Crump and I discussed our earlier drafts of these two articles. In an earlier draft
he characterized Grutter's credentials as "probably placing her near the highest ranks of applicants
to Michigan Law School." After our exchange about this characterization, Professor Crump
indicated he would probably take this out of his article.
Despite the removal of his commentary about the strength of Grutter's numerical credentials,
it is worth my making some observations about the mis-characterization ofthe comparative strength
of denied candidates in cases arising out of race-conscious admissions decision-making.
Whenever the relative strength of a candidate is discussed out of the context of comparison to
the whole pool of candidates in a given year and the criteria considered is limited to one or two
quantifiable characteristics (like LSAT scores and GPA), such a discussion often distorts the
relative merits of a candidate's application to the benefit of the individual candidate. This distortion
then makes the alleged reduction of the chances for admission of the individual candidate the basis
for arguing that race played a disproportionate role in admissions decision-making. Common sense
dictates that colleges and universities have no incentive to deny extremely well-credentialed
candidates. Absent other good reasons in the candidate's file or in comparison to other candidates
who present similar numerical credentials, schools will most often be compelled, for a whole
variety of reasons, to admit candidates who present scores and grades that are towards the high end
of the pool in any given year and deny most of those whose numbers would place them further
down in the pool of candidates. Candidates like Grutter, whose scores and academic records place
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LSAT score was solidly in the middle of the applicant pool. Her GPA was
relatively high, but closer scrutiny of her academic record beyond just the
GPA found it to be less remarkable when compared to the applicant pool
as a whole. Finally, her status as a resident of Michigan gave her an edge
relative to non-residents who applied, but resident status by itself does not
help a given applicant a great deal. Her combination of credentials (LSAT
score and GPA) arguably put her somewhere in the middle of the applicant
pool.43
Because of the many competing factors colleges and universities face
in establishing and implementing admissions decision-making regimes, the
use of any particular factor in making admissions decisions is self-limiting.
This truth is not so evident if one scrutinizes a single decision on an
individual file. However, as Justice O'Connor notes in Grutter,a broader
inspection of the policies and processes and the results therefrom is
required before a conclusion can be reached with regard to narrow
tailoring."
A. The Holistic Review of IndividualApplication Files Required by
the Policy is a Narrowly Tailored Use of Race-Conscious
Admissions Decision-Making
The Policy lays out the range of factors to be considered in reviewing
each file. One of the goals the Policy identifies is "maximizing
competence. 45 It goes on to say that the primary way, but not the only
way, of assessing the academic competence of candidates is the strength
of the LSAT scores and GPAs. The Policy discusses the weight to be given
LSAT scores and GPA in evaluating files.4 6 It also explains the limitations
that are inherent in these factors.47 Thus, while these factors are to be
considered in evaluating each candidate's file, they need not and should
not be determinative in every case for a variety of reasons. 48 The LSAT is
a test taken on one day over four hours. The test cannot and does not
purport to predict the other factors influencing academic performance like
persistence, tenacity, intellectual engagement, potential contributions to
the educational environment of the Law School, or future career
contributions to the profession or society. A GPA is of little use by itself

them towards the middle of the candidate pool have no reasonable expectation that their numerical
credentials by themselves warrant admission.
43. See infra Part III.A.; see also Dennis J. Shields, A View from the Files: Law School
Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 731, 749-51 (2003).
44. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-35.
45. PoLICY, supra note 26, at 3.
46. Id.at 3-6.
47. Id.at 4-5, 7.
48. Id.at 4-5.
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and is not useful in a comparison to the GPAs of other candidates unless
the underlying academic record is scrutinized for its rigor and depth as
well as for the quality of the institution at which the degree was earned.
The Policy makes clear that in no case is a candidate guaranteed
admission simply because of a LSAT score or GPA above a particular
level. Conversely, no candidate is to be denied admission for possessing
scores or a GPA below a certain level.49 The Policy discusses in detail
evidence of other traits and characteristics that address other goals for the
students the school admits.5° Examples of other characteristics include:
substantial successful leadership experiences, a commitment to public
service, overcoming significant personal hardships or challenges,
significant academic achievements not reflected by grades, work
experience, or other life experiences. 5 Applicants are required to submit
letters of recommendation and a personal essay.52 They also have the
option of submitting other essays for consideration." Candidates may
indicate their race or ethnicity. All candidates have the option of using one
of the essays they submit with their application to discuss how they might
contribute to the diversity the Law School hopes to create in the entering
class. 4
The Policy establishes the parameters of what is to be considered in
making admissions decisions. It makes clear that while racial and ethnic
diversity is one of the aspirations, diversity is but one of a whole range of
considerations.55 Nowhere does the Policy state that race is to be a
predominant factor to the exclusion of others. The Policy mandates that
each application be judged by the candidate's likely contribution to the
whole panoply of variables discussed by the Policy.56 This context
provides evidence of the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race.
The Policy cannot be the only measure of whether the Law School's
use of race is narrowly tailored. The implementation of the Policy is, in the
final analysis, the real test of whether the Law School was pursuing
narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions decision-making.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 9-12.
Id.
Shields, supra note 43, at 737.
Id. at 747 n.25.
Id.
POLICY, supra note 26, at 9-13.
Id. at 12-13.
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B. The Law School's Implementation of Race-Conscious
Admissions Decision-Making Was Narrowly Tailored
The plaintiffs looked long and hard throughout the trial's discovery
process for the smoking gun that would absolutely prove that the raceconscious process used by the Law School was not narrowly tailored. No
such incontrovertible evidence was found. After all was said and done the
plaintiffs based their case on one set of facts, a comparison of two grids
that reflected the results of part of the admissions decision-making
process.57 One grid reflected the results of decisions on majority
candidates, and the other showed the results of decisions on African
American candidates. The grids were configured with LSAT scores low
to high from left to right on the horizontal axis and GPAs from low to high
on the vertical axis. Each cell of the grids showed the number of applicants
whose LSAT scores and GPAs matched that point in the grid and the
number of the applicants out of that group who were offered admission.
Plaintiffs highlighted the cell where almost every African American
was admitted and compared it to the corresponding LSAT and GPA cell
on the grid for majority applicants, pointing out that almost none in that
cell were admitted. The Law School admitted that the primary reason for
the difference in results was race for the candidates in the corresponding
cells on the grid. There, said the plaintiffs, was the smoking gun. However,
race-consciousness in admissions decision-making means, by definition,
race will be a factor that will tip the scales in favor of admission of some
candidates. So, using the grids to illustrate this difference does not prove
the point. The question is not whether race made a difference. Rather, the
question is whether the use of race was narrowly tailored.
The Court looked to the results of the process as a whole to decide if
the use of race-consciousness was in fact narrowly tailored. The plaintiffs
expert witness used statistical analysis to make the point that, in the case
of candidates presenting LSAT scores and GPAs that fit into the
designated cell, race was the predominant factor in the decision to admit.5"
Tellingly, when asked about whether the same could be said about the
admissions process as a whole, he admitted that there was no evidence of
such predominance.59 The plaintiffs also conceded that every candidate the
Law School admitted was qualified.' Justice O'Connor looked at the
complete set of grids and found that the decision-making was dispersed in
a way that was consistent with the Policy.6 That is, there were some

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 335-37.
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majority and minority candidates admitted and denied in the cells
surrounding the cells highlighted by the plaintiffs.
The Bakke case, if it stood for nothing else, made clear that a school
could not reserve seats in a class by race. In Bakke, the medical school at
the University of California-Davis reserved a set number of the seats in its
entering class for minorities.62 The Court held that this was constitutionally
impermissible.63 The Law School did not set aside a certain sum of seats
for the underrepresented minority groups enumerated in the Policy. The
Policy did have as an aspiration that there be a critical mass of minority
students in its entering classes." The plaintiffs argued that this was just a
different way of requiring a quota. There was much back and forth in the
litigation about whether the data proved there was an unspoken quota for
minority students at the Law School. In the end, a majority of the Court
found the evidence inconclusive on this point,65 although one of the
dissenters was more circumspect about the quota issue.66
It would be a stretch to find a quota system by looking at the data.
There was significant variability in the number of offers of admission.
There was variability in the number of enrollees from any single group
enumerated as underrepresented minorities. The only tenuous proof was
that the percentage of underrepresented minorities in the entering class
from year to year remained relatively but not precisely constant.67 The
same could be said about any identifiable characteristic of the entering
class. For example, the number of Kansans, Californians, women, etc., was
fairly constant. This consistency was a function of how static their
presence in the applicant pool was from year to year. Thus, it was not out
of the ordinary that minority enrollment would be relatively constant also.
Here again, we see how context can make a difference. Ifunderrepresented
minority decisions are singled out, all manner of sinister practices can be
inferred. However, if the perspective is expanded to look more broadly at
the process, that context tends to discount the importance of the
similarities of results for any specific group.
There were other ways to prove a quota system was in place, and the
plaintiffs tried mightily to find evidence of these. They asked all of the
relevant administrators at the Law School directly if there was a specific
number or percentage targeted for minority enrollment.6" Each of the

62. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978) (Powell, J.).
63. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.).
64. POLICY, supra note 26, at 12.
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-37.
66. Id. at 388-90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. The administrators who were deposed or testified at trial included Dean Jeffery Lehman,
Erika Munzel, my successor as dean of admissions, and myself.
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administrators testified that there was no fixed percentage or number for
minorities in the entering class. 69 There was discussion in the drafting of
the Policy about whether or not to include a specific percentage as a goal.
The committee collectively decided not to include a goal in the final draft
of the Policy. This was raised and testified to at the trial.7° It is perfectly
reasonable that in drafting the policy there would be some discussion of
including a goal for this aspect of the Policy. It would have been more
curious if a goal had not been discussed as part of the committee's
deliberations.
Another way the plaintiffs might have proved that there was a quota
would have been some evidence that, as minority admittees withdrew,
offers of admission went out immediately to other minority candidates.
This was not the practice, and, as a result, the plaintiffs were unable to
produce evidence supporting such a theory. Other evidence would have
been discussions between the admissions office personnel and the dean or
the chair of the admissions committee about the number of offers to or
commitments from minority students. Such discussions would have tended
to prove there was a quota system in place, particularly if there was
evidence of any action taken in response to any such discussions. There
was testimony at trial that these types of discussions had not taken place.7
Try as they might, the plaintiffs could not produce evidence, other than the
grids, to support their assertion that the Law School was engaged in a
quota system.
C. The Process of Managing the Admissions Process Is Complex and
Dynamic With Many Competing Concerns that Limit the Role of
Race-Consciousnessin Admissions Decision-Making
Higher education and its admissions policies and procedures have come
under much scrutiny in the last decade. Hopwood72 is arguably the case
that first turned national attention to race-conscious admissions policies.
Then came the initiative processes in California and Washington seeking
to ban race-consciousness in those states. Then came Grutter and Gratz.74
The effect of all this attention on race-conscious admissions is the
impression that race-consciousness is the central mission of admissions
decision-making. Nothing could be further from the truth. Every institution
has many stake-holders with interests in the school. Admission decision69. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37.
70. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 835 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
71. Id The only discussions of this sort during my time as dean of admissions had to do with
the ratio of Michigan residents in the entering class.
72. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. Grutter,539 U.S. 306 (2003).
74. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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making is. one of the areas in which these constituencies have the most
active interest.
Schools receive tremendous pressure from all directions about whom
to admit. The more selective a school can be in determining whom to
admit, the more pressure on the institution. A school that ignores the
interests of its constituencies does so at some peril. Many of these
concerns are legitimate. For example, it is perfectly appropriate for
residents of a state to have an interest in the state's public colleges and
universities. Alumni rightly have an interest in their alma mater. Private
schools and public schools know that donors have an interest in them.
Most often these constituencies have a generalized interest in the wellbeing of the school, which extends to the results of its admission process.
Schools are measured in part by the perceived quality of the students who
matriculate there. However, when that interest becomes personal, the
member of the constituency involved is seldom objective about the
member's wants. This phenomenon becomes most clear when it involves
a candidate for admission in whom the (insert one of the following:
alumna, politician, donor, faculty member, parent, etc.) has a personal
interest.
The legitimacy of the concerns of any of these constituencies depends
on the context of their concerns. The weight that ought to be given to
membership in one of these constituencies in the admissions process is
subject to debate. There has been much public discussion recently on
whether or not legacy status should have any influence in admissions
decision-making. Debating the legitimacy of considering any of these
potential influences in admissions decisions is not the purpose of this
Article. I mention the presence of these competing concerns only to make
the point that race-consciousness is only one of many interests that
compete for the attention of admissions decision-makers. Each school has
an obligation to be thoughtful in responding to pressure from powerful
constituencies, both inside and outside the academy. Further, even when
it is appropriate to be sensitive to these various constituencies, blind
acquiescence will compromise academic and educational goals.
Even though diversity has been found to be a compelling interest,
diversity pursued to the extreme by a school will impede other important
educational goals. This maxim is true of any of the goals a school may set.
For example, the goal of maximizing academic competence can be
damaged by over-reliance on LSAT scores; the willingness to let legacy
status play a pivotal role in individual admissions decisions will
necessarily sacrifice other competing interests. Thus, a school, in its selfinterest, must take a measured approach to the use of any of the variables
considered in the admissions decision-making process.
The Court had evidence from a couple of different sources that a
measured approach was used by the Law School. The Policy was one
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source. Michigan state residency, academic competence, race and
ethnicity, and many other variables to be considered were discussed in the
Policy.75 The Court also had available the data from the admissions
decisions for several years. While there was some disagreement between
the majority and the dissenters about how the data could be interpreted, the
majority found that the actual decision-making was in keeping with what
was required by the Policy.7 6 The Policy and the data taken in this context
provided a basis for finding that the use of race in the admissions decisionmaking by the Law School was narrowly tailored.
III. SOME ANCILLARY POINTS OF CONTENTION WITH
PROFESSOR CRUMP

Professor Crump and I can agree to disagree about the efficacy of the
Court's reasoning in these two cases. Before addressing Professor Crump's
' there are some sidebar issues that
"Idea of Active Nondiscrimination,"77
deserve some commentary. One I have already touched on is Professor
Crump's characterization of Ms. Grutter's application for admission to the
Law School. Professor Crump presumes to know how Ms. Grutter's LSAT
score and GPA compared to the applicant pool as a whole.7" It is worth
returning to that issue. This issue and a few of Professor Crump's other
contentions are discussed below.
A. Viewed in the Context of the Applicant Poolas a Whole,
Grutter Was a Qualified but Not Particularly
Competitive Candidatefor Admission
Context is important in thinking about the relative merit of Barbara
Grutter's application for admission and the ultimate decision to deny it.
Her application was evaluated in the normal course of the admissions
process. Her LSAT score and GPA combined placed her within a range
where some but not many candidates were offered admission. In fact, most
candidates with similar LSAT scores and GPAs were denied admission.
Unquestionably, there were aspects about her that were different from
many other candidates. She was significantly older (around age forty) than
the norm in the pool of candidates, she had significant work experience,
and she was a parent of two children.79 She was a resident of Michigan."

75.
'76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

POuCY, supra note 26, at 2-3, 5, 12.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 335-38.
Crump, supra note 4, at 29.
Id. at 9.
Shields, supra note 43, at 743 n.42.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 316.
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Her GPA was relatively strong (3.8)." All of these things worked to her
advantage. Thus, in spite of a relatively modest combination of LSAT and
GPA, she was offered a place on the waitlist and not denied admission
outright like most of the similarly credentialed candidates for admission
that year.
The Law School received 3,373 applications for admission that year. 2
There were 1,163 candidates offered admission; about 800 to 1,000
candidates were placed on the waitlist8 3 Of the 800 to 1,000 candidates
initially offered a place on the waitlist, about half of them were informed
that their applications were no longer under consideration in late June of
1997." Ms. Grutter's application was among this group removed from the
waitlist and denied admission in late June. 5 The unusual aspects of her file
saved her from denial initially, but ultimately were not enough to gain her
admission. The explanation for this result is clear. A close evaluation of
her file revealed unremarkable, uninspiring, and conclusory essays. 6 A
closer review of her academic transcripts revealed that half the work was
completed in a community college and the overall work was judged not to
be particularly rigorous.87 While none of these factors, by themselves,
worked against her, taken together they were not enough to get her picked
ahead of hundreds of other candidates with similar GPAs and LSAT
scores. The Law School admitted many people with higher LSAT scores
and a significant number with lower scores. We admitted many people
with similar GPAs and many with lower GPAs. Was she admissible? Yes,
but the same could be said of at least two out of three candidates who
applied for admission that year. The fact that there were at least 400
candidates kept on the waitlist after Grutter was denied is proof that her
case was not close at all. This explains why she did not and could not
argue in her case that she would have been admitted but for race-conscious
admissions decision-making.88

81. Id.
82. Shields, supra note 43, at 741.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 743-44.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 479 n.57.
87. Id. at 750.
88. It is worth noting that most plaintiffs in admissions-related civil rights cases claiming
reverse discrimination are certain that, but for the race-conscious admissions decision-making, they
would have been admitted. One writer has called this phenomenon "the Causation fallacy."
Goodwin Liu, The CausationFallacy:Bakke andtheBasicArithmetic ofSelective Admissions, 100
MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1046 (2002).
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B. Professor Crump'sAdvice as a Pre-LawAdvisor is Suspect
In his article Professor Crump ventures into the profession of pre-law
advising. His advice is of dubious value. He suggests:
[I]f I were counseling a potential applicant to Michigan's law
school, I would say, "You were undergraduate president of
'Students for Bush'? Carefully eliminate any reference to that
from your application!" But if the applicant headed up
'Students for Gore'? I would advise, "Be sure to put that one
prominently on your application, front and center!89
This advice is nonsense. The mere listing of political affiliations neither
adds nor subtracts from the evaluation of a file. Professor Crump bases his
assumption about this bias on the testimony of one disenchanted former
employee of the Law School.9 ° He should know better. Michigan has a
large and distinguished faculty. Only someone unacquainted with the
faculty would dare to say that conservative views are particularly
unwelcome there. A thoughtful discussion of political views, no matter
where they come from on the political spectrum, would be well received
in an application.
What I see in far too many application essays are conclusory statements
about a whole variety of issues that lend nothing to the evaluation of the
application. Law schools want people who care deeply about issues. We
welcome people who are intellectually engaged in some particular issue
and who can write thoughtful essays about that subject. Thoughtful essays
are the best way to assess the ability of a candidate to add to the
intellectual discourse one hopes to encourage inside the classroom and in
the less formal interactions among students and faculty in a law school.
C. Stigmatization andAssuming the Solidarityof
Thinking by Groups
There are a couple of issues that come up whenever race-conscious
admissions decision-making is discussed, and Professor Crump raises
them in his article. One is the issue of stigma9 ' and the other is the
accusation that institutions presume all (take your pick: African
Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, or Native Americans) think
alike.92 I will deal with the issue of stigmatization first.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Crump, supra note 4, at 28.
Id.at 18.
Id.at 28.
Id.at 22-23.
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I have never been in an academic setting in higher education where at
some time someone did not question whether I had a right to be there. It
happened to me in college, it happened to me while I was in law school,
and it has happened to me even while working for three different law
schools. It is part of the world I live in as a result of being African
American in America. It always amazes me how some White people can
assume that all White people are deserving, in every instance, wherever
they happen to be, and assume the contrary of African Americans. It is
more amazing to hear it expressed that this character flaw of some White
people, and the burden it imposes on African Americans, is a reason to
place limits on the opportunities of African Americans. It is, in my view,
the most convoluted logic to be espoused by sensible people on the issue
of race-conscious admissions decision-making.
This point brings me to the issue of whether by engaging in raceconscious admissions an institution necessarily expects every person from
a particular group to hold similar views on all subjects. I am certain there
are African Americans who feel differently than I do about stigmatization.
I imagine it is one of several issues on which Justice Thomas and I do not
agree. The fact that institutions believe that persons with some trait in
common have something to offer to the educational enterprise does not
mean that the institution also assumes the persons will hold similar views
or will respond in similar ways to the same stimuli. No rational person or
institution would hold that view when there is so much evidence to the
contrary. The more opportunities people have to observe this fact the
better. This maxim is particularly true in our institutions of higher
learning.
D. ProfessorCrump Wrongly Accuses the Law School of Being
Rampantly Anti-Cuban
Professor Crump relies on an observation in Justice Kennedy's
dissenting opinion to support the contention that the faculty was rampantly
anti-Cuban.9" Justice Kennedy based this observation on the testimony of
former Dean of Admissions Alan Stillwagon. 94 Justice Kennedy spent
most of his dissenting opinion in Grutterlooking for support for his view
that the Law School's policies and practices were poorly conceived and
executed. He dug around in the Law School's admissions data to find
evidence of nefarious activity. Justice Kennedy imputes a sinister
motivation to the Policy and its implementation. In every case, there is a
much more sensible and less sinister explanation. For example, because
many minority students tended to be admitted later in the process, Justice

93. Id. at 18.
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Kennedy asserts that race was the predominant factor in admitting
minority students." The less sinister explanation, to which any
experienced law school admissions officer can attest, is that larger
numbers of minority applicants apply later in the process. Thus, their files
are not available to be read until later in the process.
Justice Kennedy attributes the more frequent review ofthe daily reports
later in the process to the desire to reach a critical mass of minority
students.9 6 The less sinister explanation is that the later in the process it is,
the more important it is to know how many candidates offered admission
are committed to coming to the school. Reviewing daily reports and
determining the number ofcommitments allows some judgment about how
to proceed and makes good sense.
Suppose, for example, that the commitments received thus far appear
to skew the gender balance of the class. It would make sense to see if
something could be done about it. If there were a low number of men in
the class, then the reaction would not be to immediately admit more men.
Rather, it would be to look at other factors like the median LSAT score
and GPA of the class, the ratio of residents in the class, etc. Then, taking
all of this information into account, an admissions officer would look to
see if there were men yet available in the applicant pool who might not
only help the gender balance of the class, but also improve the class in
other ways. The files of likely prospects would then be pulled and read
again, and ajudgment would be made on whether or not to admit any one
of those candidates. In some cases, the answer would be yes, but often it
would be no. In those cases where not enough decisions could be made to
fill the class, the admissions officer would return to square one and take
into account a larger number of factors, pull more files with those factors
in mind, and make more decisions. Context and facts make it easy to rebut
the sinister motives attributed to the Law School by even so distinguished
a jurist as Justice Kennedy.
I return to the supposed anti-Cuban bias rampant at the Law School.
Stillwagon was a witness for the plaintiffs.97 They wanted to use his
testimony to support their contention that the new policy was a new
iteration of a program called 'special admissions,"' which had evolved
out of faculty deliberations in the 1970s.9' We do not know when these
supposed comments about which Stillwagon testified took place other than
that they took place at least before June of 1990 when he left his position
at the Law School. Upon my arrival as Dean of Admissions at the Law

95.
96.
97.
98.
(Powell,

Id. at 391-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 373-74 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)
J.)).
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School, the first task I took on was discovering the policies that were to
guide admissions decision-making. What I found was a mish-mash of
conflicting directives that had no coherent theme. This finding was the
primary reason I supported the review of all admissions policies and
procedures when such a review was suggested by then-Dean of the Law
School, Lee Bollinger.
It is entirely possible that some faculty member, at some point in time,
offered an opinion about some group or groups that lacked the careful
circumspection expected from a well-educated person. However, we do
not know the context of the alleged conversation. Even assuming the truth
of the allegation, it happened well before the process of conceiving a new
policy. There was a different cast of characters drafting the Policy.99
Further, the way educational institutions think about the whole admissions
process has changed over time. This evolution is attributable to changed
attitudes and changed circumstances. For example, the makeup of the
national pool of applicants changed dramatically from the late 1970s,
when the school had last examined its admissions policies, to the early
1990s. The pool of candidates was larger and there were many more
women and minorities in the pool in 1991. Whereas African American
candidates in the national pool numbered 4,687 in 1981, by 1991 there
were closer to 8,287 and by 2003 rose to 10,604.00 This type of dramatic
increase in representation in the national pool was true of every minority
group save Native Americans.l0 ' Society had changed, was changing, and
continues to change. Thus, the way academic institutions think about
diversity evolved, and will continue to evolve. What is now thought of as
good practice and policy will most certainly change as new circumstances
arise. Higher education generally, and individual institutions in particular,
will need to be aware of these changes and be vigilant in responding to
them.
IV. PROFESSOR CRUMP'S ACTIVE NON-DISCRIMINATION IS VERY
SIMILAR TO THE MICHIGAN POLICY IN ITS EXECUTION AND RESULTS

Professor Crump's discussion of his theory of active nondiscrimination parallels what has happened in higher education over the
last several decades and is similar to the facts of Grutter. His approach is
very context-oriented. He talks at length about the history of the influence
99. The admissions committee that drafted the Policy was made up of Don Herzog, Jeff
Lehman, Richard Lempert, Don Regan, Ted Shaw, and myself. I was new to the Law School, and
therefore not privy to any previous debates about admissions at the school. Ted Shaw was also new
to the Law School. Then-Professor Lehman was relatively new to the faculty.
100. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS CouNcIL, NATIONAL STATISTICAL REPORT, 1995-96 through

199-00 (2001).
101. Id.
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of race in America and uses the term distributive justice prominently in his
argument for his theory."°2 Here, he and I agree, though I am more direct
in acknowledging that context matters.
Professor Crump argues that unconstitutional discrimination may be
inferred from distributive results.0 3 Higher education was almost
completely White until the last two decades of the twentieth century. In the
South the exclusion of African Americans was intentional and pervasive.
In other areas of the country, the discrimination was less overtly
purposeful. Higher education took notice of this discriminatory result. In
several states in the South, it took vigorous effort on the part of civil rights
activists and intervention by federal authorities to cease the intentional
exclusion of African Americans from flagship public universities. In other
areas of the country, less extreme measures were required. After the overt
barriers were removed and higher education more generally embraced
efforts to become more diverse, other obstacles had to be overcome."
Higher education has worked diligently to address the many issues that
impede its ability to attract and educate diverse populations of students.
Race-consciousness in admissions decision-making has been one tool
among many that has aided in this process. Professor Crump, like many
critics of race-conscious admissions decision-making within and without
academia, argues as if there were not ample historical evidence of the
exclusion of people of color from institutions that have been
predominantly and historically White.
The Law School is an example of an institution that rationally and
thoughtfully learned from its own experience in this regard. The Policy
explains why diversity is important to its educational mission.0" The Law
School took account of its experience with students in the past. It looked
to correlation studies to see how the traditional factors such as LSAT
scores and GPAs predicted one measure, academic competence, of its
aspirations. 0 6 It discovered that those indicators were helpful, but not
anywhere near absolute indicators of academic competence. 0 7 It took note
of the fact that these factors were most useful for predicting first year
performance but not overall academic performance in law school; and
102. Crump, supra note 4, at 29-31.
103. Id. at 31.
104. For example, there existed a limited pool of candidates for admission (in large part
because of poor pre-college educational opportunities), a need to find ways to assist students in
covering the cost of higher education, an unwillingness of likely candidates to attend institutions
where they felt they would not be welcome, an absence of role models in and out of academia, and
a multitude of other issues that impeded the magical transformation of our college campuses into
diverse communities of learning.
105. POLICY, supra note 26, at 9-10.
106. Id. at 3-4.
107. Id. at 3.
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most importantly, these factors were of no use in predicting the
professional careers of its graduates.' Thus, paraphrasing Professor
Crump, the Law School was able to overcome the bias in favor of LSAT
and GPA as the only and complete predictors of law school and
professional success through the identification of better information,
reflecting more specific evidence, which was more closely on point.
V. PROFESSOR CRUMP MISSES THE POINT OF THE COURT'S NARROW
TAILORING ANALYSIS BECAUSE OF HIS LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF
MODERN ADMISSIONS PROCESSES

It is not so amazing that Professor Crump does not understand the
admissions process. It is more amazing that the Court displayed a thorough
understanding of the process. It is plain from Professor Crump's listing of
alternative methods of attracting diverse students that he is not sensitive
to the complexity of attracting and enrolling a law school class and the
current makeup of the pool of applicants to law school each year.
In devising admissions policies and procedures, schools must consider
both the makeup of the applicant pool each year and the strategies for
attracting applicants and enrolling those applicants they admit. Only once
has data of the national results of admissions decision-making been
collected and analyzed." Wightman's analysis of the data shows that,
because of the paucity of highly credentialed Black, Hispanic, and Native
American candidates, there is no way to assure their presence in significant
numbers in law schools absent the use of race-conscious decisionmaking." ' Thus, no amount of the recruiting tactics Professor Crump
suggests could produce more than a small fraction of students from these
minority groups. For Professor Crump to even suggest that these methods
might produce results comparable to what currently occurs using raceconscious admissions decision-making makes plain how he under-values
the complexity of admissions decision-making. If he were in the loop, he
would know that each of the strategies he suggests in his article' is
already, to a greater or lesser degree, part of any effective admissions
apparatus.

108. Id. at 3-4. For a study comparing and contrasting the professional experiences of the Law
School's minority graduates with those of White graduates, see, Richard 0. Lempert et al.,
Michigan'sMinorityGraduatesin Practice:The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAw& SOc.
INQUIRY 395 (2000).
109. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education:An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Consequences ofAbandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1997).
110. Id.
111. Crump, supra note 4, at 62-70.
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An effective law school admissions operation seeks to attract a large,
diverse, and well-qualified applicant pool; it seeks to make timely
decisions on candidates; and it has a process in place to aid in recruiting
the admitted candidates to its program. Each of these components has
complexities. Recruiting applicants requires a strategy that enables the
school to identify likely candidates and encourage them to apply. Such a
strategy includes: visits to college campuses, participation in LSAC
recruitment forums, direct mail solicitations to highly credentialed
candidates, and events held at the law school for prospective applicants,
among other things. Other less direct measures for attracting candidates
include interacting with individuals and organizations that advise likely
candidates. This interaction includes: membership in pre-law advisor
organizations and attending their meetings, development of a schoolspecific network of pre-law advising contacts and maintaining ongoing
interactions with members of the network, and hosting visits to the law
school by these disparate pre-law advisors to keep them current on the
offerings of the law school.
Each of the above-listed activities is susceptible to applications that
work to attract diverse candidates for admission." 2 No decent law school
admissions officer would be unaware of who the pre-law advisors are at
colleges and universities that have significant minority student
populations. Likewise, law school admissions officers are aware of
specific programs that help develop a pipeline of likely minority law
students, such as the Council on Legal Education Opportunity. Nearly
every law school hosts programming directed to potential minority
students at every stage of the process. The Law School Admissions
Council has led a host of initiatives for its member schools
designed to
3
assist in developing a pipeline of minority students."
In addition to these more general efforts, nearly all law school
admissions operations ferret out other opportunities to reach out to
minority populations closer to home. Law schools affiliated with
universities invariably engage in outreach to minority undergraduates on
their undergraduate campuses, or host events targeted at minorities in
surrounding communities.
112. For example, for the past six years, each February a group of three to four law schools
has engaged in a tour of historically black colleges in North Carolina. Duke Law School has
coordinated this effort. The schools hold two-hour sessions with prospective students and explain
how to prepare for law school, how to apply to law school, and the pluses and minuses of a career
in law. We welcome not only juniors and seniors, but also freshmen and sophomores, to these
sessions so that they can get an early start on understanding the path to law school and can prepare
themselves accordingly.
113. LSAC provides grants for summer institutes for minority students, sponsors research on
issues relevant to minority admissions, provides matching grants to schools for minority initiatives,
and has a multitude of other initiatives.
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All of these efforts funnel candidates into the admissions decisionmaking process at a law school for consideration in light of the applicant
pool in a given year. It is only at this point that race-conscious decisionmaking comes into play. The consideration of race at this point becomes
a part of the mix of all of the other competing interests of a school as it
makes admissions decisions. The Court acknowledged, in reviewing the
results of the Law School's decisions over time, that race made a
difference in some cases but did not predominate all other
considerations." 4 Further, as Liu insightfully discusses in The Causation
Fallacy, race-consciousness has a very limited impact on majority
candidates' chances for admission." 5
VI. CONCLUSION: No, IT DOES NOT REALLY MATTER How MANY
ANGELS CAN DANCE ON THE HEAD OF A PIN

As a pedagogical technique, reviewing the vagaries of the Court's
application of its evolving strict scrutiny doctrine is a useful exercise to
teach constitutional jurisprudence. Professor Crump's analysis fails
because he refuses to understand, or take account of, the context for the
decision in Grutter. The Court in Grutter did not condone "Unchecked
Discretion" by finding the Policy and process constitutional.
Context matters when judging whether there is a compelling interest to
be furthered by the use of race-consciousness in admissions decisionmaking. In the broad context of the role of higher education in American
society, there is a basis for finding diversity to be a compelling state
interest. That context comes from the history of race in America and in
higher education in particular. As stated in Grutter,there is good reason
to defer to the expertise exhibited by the Law School in determining
whether diversity is important to its educational mission." 6 Thus, the
Court acted appropriately in finding a compelling interest in the diversity
the school sought in its student body.
Context matters when judging whether a specific admissions regimen
is narrowly tailored. Considering the context of the admissions processes
in place at the Law School, the Court had ample evidence to find that the
use of race-consciousness was narrowly tailored. The plaintiffs admitted
that every candidate admitted was qualified." 7 The data showed that all
candidates were carefully and individually evaluated and that race did not
predominate the process. 11

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-38 (2003).
Liu, supra note 88, at 1046.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 328-30.
Seeid. at 337-38.
Id.at335-37.
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So, does it matter how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? Or
stated another way, does it matter that the Court's strict scrutiny analysis
is not neat and precise; that it does not fit within a neatly defined method
of legal analysis? I think the answer is a resounding no. Satisfying strict
scrutiny analysis was not the purpose of the Court's decision. The Court
understood that its role in some instances is to do justice and help society
become more just. In seeking to do justice, context matters.
The Court rightly recognized that, in the context of higher education,
institutions have good reason to be concerned about whether or not they
can provide an educational experience for their students that is relevant in
this day and age. The Court recognized a plethora of reasons justifying
racial and ethnic diversity as a compelling interest for the institutions that
educate many of our future leaders." 9 The methods used matter as well,
but the methods used must be judged in context. In the context presented
in Grutter,the methods used by the Law School were narrowly tailored.
The Court made clear that at this time, in this society, with our history,
and our educational system, race-conscious admissions decision-making
is one tool that can, in some instances, be used to assure racial and ethnic
diversity in the most selective institutions of higher education. The Court
recognized that to find otherwise would mean a return to a mostly
homogenous student population at these institutions. The Court had clear
evidence that this result would not be good for either the education in these
institutions or American society. This conclusion is particularly true when
these same institutions know from experience that it is possible to find and
enroll competent, qualified, and able students who are racially and
ethnically diverse.
The University of Michigan and all institutions of higher education will
need to be responsive to changing circumstances. They have every
incentive to be responsive as it is in their self-interest in furtherance of
their educational goals to be vigilant about the policies and procedures
used to enroll and educate their students. The Court's decisions in Grutter
and Gratzprovide appropriate guidance as to the bounds of their discretion
in the use of race-consciousness in admissions decision-making.

119. Id. at 328-33.
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